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In the first half of the sixteenth century most inhabitants of the Low Countries 
must have experienced, in one way or another, the effects of warfare. Charles V, who 
niled the Netherlands from 1515 until 1555, was at war during nventy-three years of 
his reign. In seventeen of these war years, at least part of the miKtary operations took 
place within the Low Countries or cióse to its borders .^ In fact, no natural frontier 
protected the Netherlands from invasions by Charles's principal adversaries, the french 
kings Francis I and Henry 11. Charles of Egmond, duke of Gelderland, and later William 
von der Marck, duke of Cleves, JüHch and Berg, whose territories stretched along the 
valleys of the Lower Rhine and the Maas, constituted until 1543 useful allies of the 
French. If the two aMies co-ordinated their actions, as they did on various occasions, 
they could strike the Habsburg govemment of the Netherlands wherever they wanted. 
During the reign of Charles V the nature of military operations and the scale on 
which they took place changed dramaticaUy. Roughly speaking, the size of armies mul-
tiphed by five. In 1523 a joint English-Habsburg expeditionary forcé, under the command 
of Charles Brandon, duke of Suffolk, marched along the Somme valley towards París. 
This army numbered at the most eleven thousand men '. By the standards of the time, 
this was thought to be a formidable forcé. Nearly forty years later. Charles V besieged 
Metz with fifty five thousand men and one hundred and fifty cannons ^. Meanwhile, 
' Professor W. Blockmans (Leiden) and dr. Steven Gunn (Merton CoUgege-Oxford) commented on 
an earlier versión of this paper, Greet Hemus corrected my English. To all of them I express my gratitude. 
Of course, I retain añ responsabilities for an eventual lack of clarity or remaining mistakes. 
^ On Charles V as a warrior see BLOCKMANS, W., Keizer Karel V. De utopie van het keizenchap. 1}00-1}?8, 
Leuven, 2000, pp. 77-112. 
' GUNN, S. J., «The Duke of Suffolk's March on París in 1523», in English Historical Review, 101 
(1986), pp. 596-634. 
•* ZELLER, G., Le siége de Metz par Charles Quint, Nancy, 1943, passim and PARKER, G., «De politieke 
wereld van Karel V», in SoLY, H. (ed.), Karel V, V00-15Í8. Dekeizeren zijn tijd, Antwerpen, 1999, pp. 215-217. 
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both the Habsburg and the Valois princes had each ordered, on their side of the border 
die constniction of a series of fortresses and new Italian-style town-circuits. So, by the 
time the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, which was concluded in 1559, put an end to 
the Habsburg-Valois wars, a total of twelve towns in the Low Countries possessed a 
completely new circuit, whUe eighteen more disposed of a partially new circuit'. At 
that point, society in the Netherlands was far more müitarised than it had been at 
the beginning of the century. To mention only one aspect of this increased importance 
of the military: ever since Charles V had sent four thousand Spanish soldiers to the 
Netherlands in Jnly 1522, the presence of Iberian troops was considered to be vital 
for the defence of these lands. They would remain a common feature there for the 
next two centuries''. 
To my knowledge, historians have, surprisingly enough, never tried to study in a 
systematic way the consequences of this growing military activity for society in the Low 
Countries. A book such as David Potter's masterpiece War and Government in which 
he demonstrates to what extent Picardy's identity was shaped by the Franco-imperial 
wars has not been written yet for the Habsburg Netherlands .^ Therefore the main 
objective of this paper is to offer the readers a first overview of the changes which 
Charles Vs wars might have brought about in the society of the sixteenth century Net-
herlands. In what follows, I shaE argüe that the political and commercial élites in the 
county of Holland were the main beneficiaries of these changes. Their growing political 
and financial maturity and their newly acquired economic prosperity during the reign 
of Charles V would enable them later on to successfully sustain the long lasting revolt 
against Charles's son Philip 11. 
The growing number of soldiers mustered at the outbreak of every war and the 
frenetic constniction of new defensive bulwarks caused a huge increase in public spen-
ding. To face up to its financial difficulties, the govemment of the Low Countries extrac-
ted three sources of income: taxes, loans and transfers of money out from other Habsburg 
dominions. The emergence of this financial system and its eventual breakdown in the 
late 1550's is up to now by far the best-studied aspect of the impact of warfare on 
the population in the Low Countries *. 
' BRULEZ, W. , «Het gewicht van de oorlog in de nieuwe tijden. Enkele aspekten», in Tijdschrift voor 
Geschiedenis, 91 (1978), pp. 394-395; PARKER, G., The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rjse 
of the West. 1500-1800, Cambridge, etc., 1996^, cap. 1 núm. 17 Towns with a complete new circuit were: 
Antwerp, Avesnes, Bapaume, Bouchain, Charlemont, Damvillers, Gravelines, Groenlo, Hesdinfert, Marien-
bourg, Phiüppeville and Yvois/Carignan. Towns with a partially new circuit were: Aire, Arras, Béthune, Bour-
bourg, Cambrai, Douai, Groningen, Harlingen, Landrecies, Le Quesnoy, Luxemburg, Mons, Montmédy, Saint-
Omer, Thionville, Utrecht, Valenciennes and Zutfen. Furthermore Charles ordered the construction of citaldels 
to control the towns of Cambrai, Ghent and Utrecht. Later Philip 11 did the same at Antwerp. 
^ FAGEL, R., De Hispano-Vlaamse wereld. De contacten tussen Spanjaarden en Nederlanders. 1496-153'), 
Brussel and Nijmegen, 1996, pp. 382-407. 
^ PoTTER, D., War and Govemment in the French Provinces. Picardy 1470-1560, Cambridge, etc., 1993. 
" BLOCKMANS, W . , «The Low Countiies in the Middle Ages», in BONNEY, R. (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal 
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In the sixteenth century Netherlands, the central govemment could not tax the 
population at will. In order to obtain fiscal income, govemment ofBcials had to drive 
hard bargains with the various regional assemblies, known as Staten or States. In all 
regions the leading members of the States were deputies from the bigger towns. In 
Holland six towns traditionally sent representatives: Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, 
Amsterdam and Gouda. Four towns were represented in the Brabantine States: Brussels, 
Louvain, Antwerp and's Hertogenbosch. Also in the States of Flanders four members 
monopolized the decision-making process: Ghent, Bruges, Ypres and the so-called Franc 
de Bruges. These three regions, Flanders, Brabant and Holland, produced more than 
three quarters of all the fiscal income of the Prince in the Low Countries. 
Although in the end the various States nearly always granted a certain amount of 
money for a Hmited period of time, they kept a hold on important levers of financial 
policy. Thus for example, the assessment and the collection of the agreed sums remained 
a competence of the States. In fact, the growing demands of the central govemment 
throughout Charles's reign even strengthened the States' position in the political field 
of the Netherlands. In 1557-'58, for instance, the Habsburg govemment was forced 
to accept the restrictive conditions upon which the assembly of the joint States, called 
States-General, made dependent its resolution to provide the necessary funds to continué 
the war against the French. As a result of this agreement the deputies of the States, 
and not govemment officials, would supervise the recmitment of a new army that should 
consist of thirty thousand infantrymen and eight thousand cavalrymen '. 
Meanwhile some of the regional States had become serious competitors of the central 
govemment on the money market. From the 1550's onwards the States of Holland 
for example, fínanced their so-called beden, that is to say grants or subsidies, to the 
central govemment largely by taking out loans. As a significant proportion of the mo-
neylenders themselves belonged to the economic élite of Holland, the States tended, 
in clear contrast to the attitude of the govemment, to redeem contracted liabilities. 
So the States gradually gained the confídence of an ever-larger portíon of the potential 
investors enabling them to attract more money on better conditions than the central 
govemment could '". Obviously, this practice greatiy enhanced the financial and political 
position of the States of Holland. 
In fact the States were mosdy rather reluctant to concede the Emperor money to 
State in Europe, ca. 1200-1815, Oxford, etc., 1999, pp. 281-308; MADDENS, N. , De heden in het graafschap 
Vlaanderen tijdens de regering van keizer Karel V, 1515-1550 (Anciens Pays et Assemblées d'Etats 72), Kor-
trijk-Heule, 1978; TRACY, J. 0., «The taxation system of the county of Holland during the reigns of Charles V 
and Philip U, 1519-1566», in Economtschen Sociaal Historisch Jaarboek, 48 (1985), pp. 71-117 and TRACY, 
J. D., Holland under Habsburg Rule, 1Í06-1Í66. The Formation of a Boy Politic, Berkeley, etc., 1990, passim. 
' MEILINK,?. A. (ed.),«NotulenenGeneraalAdviesvandeStaten-Generaalvan 1557-1558», mBijdragen 
en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap, 55 (1934), pp. 263-369, and VERHOFSTAD, K. J. W., De regering 
der Nederlanden in dejaren 15í}'15}9, Nijmegen, 1937, pp. 113-158. 




conduct his wars. They definitely did not share Charles's idea of glory ". In their opinión 
wars only hampered the trade upon which the prosperity of the Low Countries depended. 
In particular the so-called fífth and sixth Valois-Habsburg wars that raged respectively 
between 1552 and 1556 and between 1557 and 1559 seriously damaged trade. In 1552 
and 1553 for instance, the quantity of French wine available on the Antwerp market 
only amounted to one third of the volume that was traded in 1550 '^ . 
Grain prices also rose sharply in 1552 and 1553 '^ . This phenomenon, just as the 
decline in the import of French wines, was at least partially due to the Habsburg-Valois 
wars. Some important military campaigns of these years took place in the fertile regions 
of Picardy and Artois. Arniies of both parties plundered villages and devastated crops 
in the área, as they had done on previous occasions '''. Apparently, this time the damage 
inflicted was so serious that local farmers and traders did not recover their export markets 
in the Low Countries. Meanwhile, Dutch merchants had tumed to the Baltic región 
to provide the Netherlands with grain. The town of Amsterdam in Holland, through 
which this Baltic grain was imported, owed its quick economic development in the 
sixteenth century largely to the stormy growth of this so-called moedemegotie or mother-
trade ". 
Not all the grain that was imported through Amsterdam reached ordinaiy consumers. 
In wartime the govemment's first priority was clearly to provisión the troops. To supply 
them, govemment ofíicials regularly tapped large quantities of food from the market. 
In this way they created artificial shortages and these boosted the prices. To give but 
one example: in spring 1557 large quantities of Baltic rye that were shipped via Ams-
terdam and Antwerp had as final destination the garrisons at the southem border of 
the Netherlands. While these commodities were not offered on the market, the pnce 
of rye in Antwerp doubled between april and june 1557 '*. Obviously such situations 
created serious social tensions. 
" BLOCKMANS, W., «De onderdanen van de keizer», in SoLY, H. (ed,), ¥j¡rel V..., op. cit., Antwerpen, 
1999, p. 258. 
'^  CRAEYBECKX, J., U« grand commerce d'importation: les vins de France aux anciens Pays-Bas (xme-XMe 
siécles), París, 1958, pp. 226-227. 
" SoLY, H., «Economische vemieuwing en sociale weerstand. De betekenis en aspiraties der Antwerpse 
middenklasse in de ló"*" eeuw», in Tijdschrifi voor Geschiedenis, 83 (1970), p. 522, and TIELHOF, M. van. 
De Hollandse graanhandel, 1470-1570. Koren op de Amsterdamse molen (Hollandse Historische Reeks 23), 
Den Haag, 1995, p. 247. 
" PoTTER, D., War and Govemment.., op. cit., Cambridge, etc., 1993, pp. 215-221, and TIELHOF, M. 
van. De Hollandse graanhandel..., op. cit., Den Haag, 1995, 
" In fact, during the Franco-Burgundian wars and the civil viíars of the last quarter of the fifteenth 
centrury, Baltic grain conquered for the first time a substantial share of the food market in the Low Countries; 
see UYTVEN, R. Van, «Sociaal-economische evoluties in de Nederlanden vóór de Revoluties (veertiende Bzes-
tiende eeuw)», en Bijdragen en Mededelingen hetreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 87 (1972), pp. 65-67. 
" SoLY, H., «Een Antwerpse Compagnie voor de levensmiddelenbevoorrading van het leger in het Neder-
landen in de zestiende eeuw», in Bijdragen en Medelingen hetreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 86 
(1971), pp. 350-362. The example is taken firom pp. 360-361. 
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The Valois-Habsburg wars were also at least partially responsible for the changes 
the fishing fleet of the Low Countries underwent in the sixteenth century. It is quite 
possible that due to ecological transformations, herrings moved en masse from fishing 
grounds on the English south shore to the central North Sea, and that therefore fis-
hermen from Holland gained a competitive advantage. But this supposition cannot enti-
rely explain the quick expansión of the herring industry of Holland at the expense 
of the Flemish and the Zeeland industries. By 1550 the Holland herring fleet had defi-
nitely outgrown the fleets of the two other regions. The ever-bolder activities of French 
privateers must have played a role in this process. The shores of Holland were simply 
further away from the bases of these privateers. Moreover, they did not daré to risk 
themselves into the Zuider Zee. So a place such as Enkhuizen that specialized in the 
fishing and trade of herrings was safe from their attacks '^. 
In fact, it was only in 1543, after the definitive conquest of Gelderland, that the 
Zuider Zee became a safe, interior sea for the inhabitants of Holland and their Habsburg 
masters. Until that year Gelderland privateers had regularly taken vessels whose des-
tination was one of the ports of Holland on the southem or westem shore of the Zuider 
Zee, such as Amsterdam, Hoom or Enkhuizen, to ñame only the most important ones. 
These towns had a clear interest in the Habsburg conquest of Gelderland. No wonder 
that at least since the beginning of the sixteenth century they had lobbied upon Philip 
the Fair and his son and successor Charles V to secure the final conquest of Gelderland. 
In their struggle against the duke of Gelderland the Holland towns of the Zuider Zee 
did not have to rely completely on the Habsburg princes. In 1517 for instance, they 
themselves had equipped a fleet that destroyed the vessels of several Frisian and Gel-
derland privateers '*. 
The conquest of Gelderland was not only in the interest of towns along the coast 
of the Zuider Zee. Southem and eastem towns along the land and river bordar with 
Gelderland such as Dordrecht, Gouda, Schoonhoven and Ijsselstein had all faced at 
some point attacks, or even worse, plundering by troops of the duke of Gelderland 
or his allies. In Match 1528 even The Hague, the administrative capital of the county, 
had been occupied for a while by Gelderland troops under command of the all too 
famous Maarten van Rossum. To end this nuisance the States of Holland in the 1520's 
took an active part in the debates on the conduct of the Guelders wars and they granted 
unprecedentedly large subsidies. Although it would still take fifteen years after the de-
vastating raid of Maarten van Rossum through the south of Holland, before Gelderland 
" SiCKLNG, L., Zeemacht en onmacht. Maritteme politiek in de Hederlanden, 1488'15Í8 (Bijdragen tot 
de Nederlandse marinegeschiedenis 7), Amsterdam, 1998, pp. 104-105; Uem, «De Zuiderzee en de territoriale 
afronding van de Nederianden onder Karel V», in Holland, XXX, Haariem, 1998, p. 138, and TRACY, J, D., 
«Herring wars: The Habsburg Netherlands and the struggle for control of the North Sea, ca. 1520-1560», 
in The Sixteenth Century ]oumal, 24 (1993), pp. 249-272. 
" SlCKiNG, L., «De Zuiderzee...», op. cit., in Holland, XXX, Haariem, 1998, pp. 127-141. 
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was annexed to the Habsburg Netherlands, the States of Holland would not lose again 
the political influence they had gained diiring the years of intensive warfare " . 
All this dees not mean that the inhabitants of Holland were not involved in the 
other wars of the Emperor, and in particular in the Valois-Habsburg conflict. On the 
contrary, the States of Holland continued to grant their subsidies in order to pay for 
the imperial armies. But the political élites of the country took only actively part in 
the conflicts they themselves had a keen interest. So during the 1520's the States con-
sistenlty refused the govemment's plan to créate a permanent Dutch rmlitia. The States 
disHked the idea not only because such a forcé could curb in the end their influence, 
but also because its reahsation would be a very costly matter. In these years a masón 
in Haarlem or Leiden eamed twice as much as a hired Swiss or Germán infantryman '^'. 
On the other hand, when HoUand's interest were really at stake, the States were prepared 
to intervene. So in the autumn of 1533 they payed for a fleet that was sent out against 
Lübeck. In this case the Dutch and the Habsburg interests were identical ^'. 
As we have seen, the growing political influence of Holland coincided largely with 
the outset of an economic boom in that country. To some extent this economic boom 
came about as a side effect of the wars that raged on the southem borders of the 
Low Countries ^ .^ From this first overview, which should be completed by more research, 
it seems as if the country of Holland was in many respects the main beneficiary of 
Charles V s wars. On the one hand, the political and economic élites of the coimtry 
had a keen interest in the conquest of Gelderland; on the other hand they did not 
suffer the negative effects of the Valois-Habsburg wars that the inhabitants of the big 
Flemish and Brabantine cities felt. On the contrary, Dutch merchants seized the oppor-
tunities the wars offered them. 
" On the growing political influence of the States of Holland, see TRACY, J. D., Holland under Habsburg 
Rule..., op. cit., Berkeley, etc., 1990, pp. 65-89. 
-° TRACY, J. D. , Holland under Habsburg Rule..., op. cit., Berkely, etc., p. 76, and NOORDEGRAAF, L., 
Hollands welvaren? Levensstandaard in Holland, 1450-1650, Bergen, 1985, pp. 69-70. 
" SlCKlNG, L., Zeemacht en omacht..., op. cit., Amsterdam, 1998, pp. 115-117 
^^  On the underiying origins of Holland's economic sustained growth see BLOCKMANS, W., «The economic 
expansión of Holland and Zeeland in the fourteenth-sixteenth centuries», in AERTS E. A. (eds.), Studia Histórica 
Oeconomica. Uher Amicorum Hermán Van Der Wee, Leuven, 1993, pp. 41-58. 
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